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ABSTRACT 
Translating complex, politicised and ambiguous European legislation and case law into practice is  
the diﬃcult everyday  condition  for street-level bureaucrats in European Member States. Yet their 
crucial role remains remarkably understudied in EU compliance literature. This paper argues that 
40street-level bureaucrats at local implementing levels in Europe are bound to manoeuver between 
what we deﬁne as respectively a European and a  national  legal  logic in the patchwork of EU rules 
on free movement, equal treatment and cross-border social rights. The two legal logics are strikingly 
diﬀerent, yet coexisting. Nonetheless, street-level bureaucrats are left without suﬃcient guidance in 
how to prioritise and administer the rules. Consequently, discretion of unclear, core concepts in 
European social law such as ‘unreasonable burden’, ‘jobseeker’ and ‘worker’ is decentralised, 
resulting in fragmented outcome on the ground. In the limbo between a European and national logic, 
Union solidarity, we ﬁnd, gets lost in translation. 
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 Introduction  
Free movement of persons, the right to welfare across borders and equal treatment constitute a core 
part of the European social Union and form the nexus of Union solidarity. Over the last decades, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)   has played a key role in further deﬁning and 
contesting the scope and limits of the emerging social Union. An expansive practice of the Court, 
widening the social protection of mobile Europeans, is now claimed to be replaced by a restrictive 
trend, where social cross-border rights are limited (Dougan 2013). We argue that no matter the trend, 
two diﬀerent, yet coexisting, legal logics emerge from this evolved patchwork of rules: respectively 
a European and national logic, representing respectively further European integration or protection 
of national welfare. They are strikingly diﬀerent, leading to distinctively diﬀerent outcomes, and yet 
they coexist in the same pool of applicable EU legislation and case law. 
How this strand of complex legislation is translated into practice and how street-level bureaucrats in 
Member States prioritise between the two legal logics is essential for the materialisation of the social 
protection provided by EU social law. But the actual eﬀect of these rules on national welfare states 
has only been examined to some extent and EU implementation studies have instead predominantly 
focused on national transposition of EU law (Mastenbroek 2003; Haverland and Romeijn 2007; 
Hartlapp 2009). The practical and local implementation of European social law has not caught much 
scholarly attention despite encouragement to do so (Versluis 2007; Thomann and Sager 2017; 
Mastenbroek 2006). Only very recent research provides a bottom-up approach to EU implementation 
and highlights the importance of local implementers’ role in and individual motivation for turning 
EU law into a sometimes fragmented practice on ground (Dörrenbächer 2017). Others point out their 
role in actively containing the inﬂuence of the CJEU (Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017). Despite 
their crucial role in turning EU law into ‘action’ (Versluis 2003), yet insuﬃcient attention has been 
paid to the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats in eﬀectuating the continuously changing rules and 
rights of Europe. This is where we aim to contribute. 
This article takes us to this forefront of the European social Union. Ultimately, it considers how street-
level bureaucrats function as crucial stakeholders when Court-driven rules are translated into practice 
on the ground. Recent literature has shown through an ethnographic legal method how Union 
solidarity is preserved for more privileged Union citizens while the rights of more vulnerable groups, 
conditioned by low-paid jobs, illness, parental leave and ﬁxed-term contracts, are submerged by 
street-level bureaucrats in their practical implementation of CJEU jurisprudence (O’Brien 2017). This 
paper examines more speciﬁcally the importance of the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats in the 
practical administration of EU rules and rights. Focus is on how they manoeuver between the two 
diﬀerent, yet coexisting, legal logics and how their behaviour may be shaped when EU law is unclear 
and potentially clashes with national provisions and political signals. The behaviour of street-level 
bureaucrats is crucial for the aim of this paper as well as the broader EU compliance literature as 
street-level bureaucrats make the everyday decisions on EU citizens’ entitlements under EU law – 
the actual outcome of EU rules. 
In concrete, we examine what inﬂuences street-level bureaucrats’ decisions on homeless EU citizens’ 
access to public shelters in the Member State of Denmark. Denmark constitutes a crucial case for 
examining the disposition of caseworkers when implementing EU law on the ground. Denmark is a 
unitary state with relatively high administrative capacity. Furthermore, a culture of ‘law observance’ 
with EU law is argued to guide political and administrative behaviour in Denmark (Falkner et al. 
2007). 
We examine street-level bureaucrats’ dispositions upon the case of homeless EU citizens’ access to 
public shelters in Denmark. What happens when the implementation of ambiguous and contested EU 
law concerns the rights of the poorest and presumably least-wanted group of mobile Europeans? This 
case serves to examine the scope of Union solidarity. It is furthermore well-suited for examining what 
inﬂuences the decisions of street-level bureaucrats as the ministerial interpretation of EU law on this 
matter changed in 2014, extending the social rights of EU citizens informed by a European rather 
than a national logic. 
This paper engages with the downside of European free movement and how relevant EU legislation 
and case law fail to protect. 15.3 million Europeans resided in another EU Member State by the end 
of 2014. However, an unknown share experience comedown and need for shelter. Recent oﬃcial 
counting of homeless in Denmark reports a remarkable increase in the number of foreign homeless 
migrants of which EU nationals constitute the large majority. Only three European individuals, 
however, were registered in public shelters. The use of private shelters is signiﬁcantly more frequent 
among Union citizens than among homeless Danes, indicating that EU citizens have a considerable 
demand for shelter but avoid public oﬀers (interviews 2015 PSMM3, PSMM5). 
We examine the decisions of street-level bureaucrats upon rich empirical research going into depth 
with practices on the ground in the ﬁnal implementing phase. This is where supranational rules and 
rights are turned into practice. We have conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with a total of 27 
key respondents between August 2015 and June 2017 in respectively the central and local executive 
level as well as among street-level bureaucrats themselves and private shelter mangers (all 
anonymised according to  title of respectively civil servant, street-level bureaucrat or private shelter 
manager, i.e. CS, SLB or PSM). Interviews are triangulated with available data, oﬃcial and unoﬃcial 
documents. The respondents at central level represent the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, The Danish 
Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment, Danish Immigration Service and the State 
Administration. The local level is represented by ﬁve case municipalities (anonymised as M1, M2, 
M3, M4 and M5), selected primarily upon having EU residents and representing the biggest Danish 
cities and secondly upon variation in overall population size, political leadership and geography. The 
interviewed street-level bureaucrats are shelter managers from public shelters in each of  the  ﬁve  
municipalities,  providing  insights into the ﬁnal level of implementation of this EU law and how it is 
turned into practice. 
The paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst present the theoretical framework for examining the role 
of street-level bureaucrats in the EU implementation process. We then introduce EU rules and show 
how they are informed by respectively European and national logics. Three analytical parts examine 
the practical implementation of transforming these rules into rights. In conclusion, we reﬂect upon 
how our ﬁndings correspond with our theoretical expectations. 
 
Frontline implementation of EU law 
Studies of EU compliance have foremost focused on judicial implementation of directives, aiming to 
explain variation in Member States’ transposition performance. However, after transposition comes 
practical implementation. Versluis’ study of ‘EU law in action’ points out that although EU law may 
be transposed correctly and completely, it can still have limited eﬀect on ground (2007). The 
numerous studies of legal implementation are found to be narrow in perspective and insuﬃcient to 
understand and explain the subsequent steps of applying EU law (Versluis 2007, 50). We argue that 
implementation literature originally derived from the studies of federal states, provides a useful 
theoretical and conceptual platform for exploring the eﬀectuation of EU law further. Implementation 
research tells us that street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour, capacity and attention are crucial to policy 
outputs and outcomes (Lipsky, 2010 [1980]) as they make ‘important discretionary decisions’ for the 
target groups  of  implementation  (Winter  2012, 260). The theoretical puzzle in focus in this paper 
thus becomes what inﬂuences such behaviour. 
As in classical implementation research, EU implementation as a concept covers how objectives, 
rights and obligations of EU law are carried out, accomplished, fulﬁlled, produced or completed (see 
Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, xxi). To examine the eﬀectuation of EU law, we argue that an 
‘integrated’ implementation perspective is needed. The model centres around the most important 
explaining variables that research of national implementation has identiﬁed to condition 
implementation results (Winter 2012, 257ﬀ). Outcomes of policy objectives constitute the dependent 
variable, which  in our case is deﬁned as EU citizens’ access to public shelters. 
According to the integrated implementation model, organizational and inter-organizational behaviour  
are factors  likely to condition  outcomes. This resembles the insights  in an EU setting gained from 
transposition studies. Conﬂicts between national coalition partners, between ministries, boards and 
agencies are likely to impair the quality of judicial implementation. Contrarily, administrative 
capacity and inter-ministerial coordination is held to positively impact on implementation 
performance (Haverland and Romeijn 2007; Mastenbroek 2003). This points to the importance of 
how diﬀerent executive levels interact in order to implement EU law. For our case, we expect the 
interaction and agreement between diﬀerent executive levels to inﬂuence the dispositions of street-
level bureaucrats. 
The integrated implementation model then informs us that policy formulation and policy design 
condition which outcome is produced. They both shape implementation and dispositions of street-
level bureaucrats (May 2012). Conﬂicts from the policy for- mulation phase may lead to a policy 
design with ambiguous objectives and mixed or ineﬀective instruments. Such unresolved conﬂicts 
will continue into the implementation phase (Bardach 1977). In addition, the individual attitude of 
the caseworker is likely to impact on his/her decisions (Dörrenbächer 2017). In other words, the 
policy-making process and thus policy design matters to implementation as it carries forward 
conﬂicts, ambiguity, discretion and salience. Applied to our case, we expect the clarity of EU rules 
and how they are reﬂected in the Danish policy to inﬂuence the dispositions of street-level 
bureaucrats. 
Furthermore, politicians can inﬂuence street-level behaviour by the laws they adopt, the instruments 
they assign to meet their policy goals but also by their ‘signals’, i.e. the importance and priority they 
communicate to a policy. The extent to which politicians take ownership for a policy and 
communicate the political goals clearly is likely to matter in how the policy is implemented in the 
frontlines. Political attention signals to street- level bureaucrats that what they do on the ground is 
noticed (Winter and May 2007, 456). Hereto comes managerial inﬂuence, which concerns the extent 
to which administrative superiors signal the importance of a policy. In concrete, this may be done 
when higher-level civil servants supervise and monitor frontline decisions. Management of practices 
is no easy task as street-level bureaucrats normally enjoy considerable discretion. On the other hand, 
supervision, clearly communicated goals and expectation may limit such discretion and diminish the 
policy divergences between political objectives, management and the frontlines of implementation 
(Winter and May 2007). However, for political and managerial signalling to matter the most, it needs 
to be performed in agreement. If local politicians signal their disagreement with national politicians, 
street-level bureaucrats are likely to be inﬂuenced. 
Applied to our case, formulating our third and last theoretical expectation, we expect political and 
managerial signalling to inﬂuence the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats. 
 
EU rules: European and national logic  
One of the most substantive achievements of the European social Union is the right for European 
citizens to move to another Member State, become member of that Member State’s welfare 
community and there enjoy the right to equal treatment. However, at the same time EU and national 
law detail and  condition  the scope  and limits of these rules and rights. We show that from this 
patchwork of rules and  rights,  two diﬀerent  legal logics emerge and may inform street-level 
bureaucrats when granting access to shelters.  
The ﬁrst path rests upon a European logic, steered by the aspiration after further European integration. 
This is reﬂected in the  establishment  of  Union  Citizenship  in the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 
and  the  right  to  move  and  reside  freely  within the Union, now enshrined in the Treaty provisions 
of Article 20(1),  20  (2a) and  21(1) TFEU. The second path rests upon a national logic, derived from 
secondary legislation, primarily Directive 2004/38. In Denmark, the Directive is transposed among 
others by way of a legal act (‘Udlændingeloven’)1 and ministerial order (‘EU-
holdsbekendtgørelsen’).2  
This European logic is steered  by  a  wish  to  protect Member State interests and national welfare. 
According  to  this  logic,  status  as  a ‘worker’ becomes the gateway of entrance into the national 
welfare system. Worker status depends on contributions to the hosting Member State  in  the  form  
of  work prior to being included in the national solidarity sphere. The status can be retained 
temporarily under certain conditions in the case of involuntary unemployment. Safeguards have been 
inserted in the Directive 2004/38 requiring that the person must not become an ‘unreasonable burden’ 
upon the social assistance system of a hosting member state (Art. 14(1)). Both  paths  can  be deferred  
from  the  patchwork of EU regulation and case law but vary in conditions demanded of the mobile 
European, resting upon respectively a low and higher bar of inclusion. The Court has played a 
tremendous role within both paths in deﬁning the personal and material scope of and limits to cross-
border welfare regulation, interpreting who should have rights to which types of social beneﬁts 
(Dougan 2013). Firstly, we elaborate on how the Court has expanded social rights. 
Most remarkably, the Sala case in 1998 (C-85/96) initiated a judicial vision of Union Citizenship as 
a fundamental status of Member State nationals (Dougan 2013, 133). Grzelczyk (C-184/99), 
established also in case law the right to move and reside freely as a result of rejecting discrimination 
upon nationality no matter worker status (para 29 and 31). Here, the Court also clariﬁed that despite 
the safeguards introduced to protect against ‘unreasonable burden[s]’, Member States are expected to 
accept ‘a certain degree of ﬁnancial solidarity’ (para 44). Baumbast (C-413/99) granted equal 
treatment and access to the welfare schemes of a hosting Member State also for economically inactive 
Union citizens. Brey (C-140/12) ruled against the automatic exclusion of Union citizens from beneﬁts 
in another hosting Member State and required an individual assessment of personal circumstances 
such as duration of residence, amount of income, amount and duration of beneﬁts claimed. Both the 
Baumbast and Brey cases are pivotal for establishing the fundamental status of Union  Citizenship  
also  for  economically inactive EU citizens. 
The expansive phase of the Court described above is argued to have  turned  into a  more reactionary 
phase – in our terms a national logic – across the three core features of free movement of persons, the 
right to cross-border welfare  and  equal  treatment  (O’Brien 2016; Shuibhne, 2015). In the Förster 
(C-158/07) and Vatsouras (C-23/08) cases, the Court examines the more restrictive formulations of 
secondary law, as deﬁned in Directive 2004/38, derogating from Union citizens’ general right to equal 
treatment (Dougan 2013, 140). The more restrictive judicial approach has become  even  more  
notable in the recent case law of Dano (C-333/13), Alimanovic  (C-67/14)  and  García-  Nieto (C-
299/14). All state clearly the necessity of a link to the host Member State in order to fully access 
social assistance. As Jacqueson concludes; ‘[w]ork is more or less the sole gateway for Union citizens 
to access social rights’ (7 July 2016, http://beucitizen.eu/ back-to-business-the-court-in-alimanovic/). 
Two complex and at times contradictory logics coexist in the EU regulation on free movement, equal 
treatment and subsequent social rights.  Their  coexistence  creates  room for manoeuvre for the local 
administrations and caseworkers and their potential conﬂict is expected to inform all three 
expectations as a silent, yet crucial background variable. Firstly, it may complicate the interaction 
and agreement between diﬀerent executive levels when two diﬀerent logics are at play, vis-à-vis the 
ﬁrst expectation. Secondly, it may obviously make the EU rules more diﬃcult to interpret and result 
in lack   of clarity, vis-à-vis the second expectation. Thirdly, it may make street-level bureaucrats 
more vulnerable to political and managerial  signalling,  vis-à-vis  the  third  expectation.  We now 
turn to examine exactly this through our three theoretical expectations concerning what conditions 
the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats when Union citizens ask for shelter. 
Interaction between executive levels 
In the wake of the Central and Eastern European enlargement  in  2007,  the  former  Danish Minister 
for Welfare from the liberal party Venstre stated that  ‘Denmark should  not become the shelter for 
all European citizens’ (Politiken, 22 December 2007). As  a direct  consequence, Danish shelters were 
instructed  to  deny  access  to  homeless Union  citizens.  In 2011, a Social Democratic coalition  
government   took  oﬃce   and  for three years, it maintained the position of the former government. 
However, in December  2014,  the  government  changed  position  with  reference  to  Directive  
2004/38. As a result, new guidelines were produced, now instructing public shelters to welcome 
homeless EU nationals under certain conditions. We identify this change in policy December 2014 
as a movement from a national logic to a more European logic. This change is rather remarkable seen 
in the context of the CJEU’s turnaround claimed to have undergone the opposite change from an 
expansive to a more restrictive path. The argumentation in the new Ministry guidelines prove 
strikingly European and reﬂects a high level of solidarity. Worker status is not a precondition for 
access, as would be the case if national logic dominated, and apart from belonging to the  target 
group,3 only  two conditions are  required; 1) lawful residence  according to the Directive and 2), that 
the EU national will not become  an  ‘unreasonable  burden’ when being allowed access to the 
shelters. 
The guidelines were produced in collaboration between the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and the 
Ministry of Justice (interview 2017 CSMinistry). Whereas the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs only 
required that the person should belong to the target group and have lawful residence, the Ministry of 
Justice inferred the condition on ‘unreasonable burden’. The inter-ministerial coordination was sparse 
in this process. Without further  collaboration,  the Ministries simply wrote one page each, deﬁning 
respectively how to open up versus how to restrict access. The confusion at local and street-level, 
identiﬁed beneath, on how  to balance access to public shelters with the assessment  of  ‘unreasonable  
burden’  begins here (interview 2017 CSMinistry). This suggests the importance of horizontal, inter-
ministerial coordination for the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats in carrying out a policy. 
An email notifying about the new guidelines was sent from the Ministry to all 98 municipalities’ main 
inboxes (interview 2017 CSMinistry). Despite this sparse circulation,  all ﬁve case municipalities 
have somehow heard of the new guidelines (interviews 2015 CSM1-M5). There was no circulation 
from the municipalities, besides one (M3), down the administrative ladder to the shelters. As a shelter 
manager states,  ‘This  might  sound  crazy, but I found the Ministry guidelines on Facebook, not via 
the municipality’ (inter-  view 2015 SLBM4). This suggests beyond the theoretical expectation that 
not only horizontal coordination matters, but also vertical, in this case (inadequate) downward, 
dissemination from the Ministry to the frontline inﬂuences the dispositions of the street- level 
bureaucrats. 
Shortly after circulating the new guidelines, the Ministry invited a small group of the 98 Danish 
municipalities to an orientation meeting (interviews  2015 CSM2-M3, CSM5). This resulted in the 
production of municipal guidelines in two of our case municipalities (interviews 2015 CSM3, 
SLBM5). In one of them, the local guidelines, however, were not disseminated among shelter 
managers who should carry out the policy. Moreover, the local guidelines directly dispute the 
Ministry  and  deny  access  to  job-seeking  EU nationals (interviews 2015 CSM3, SLBM3). They 
contradict the European logic of the ministerial guidelines and suggest incomplete communication 
and control between the administrative levels. Furthermore, they reproduce the opinion of the 
association and interest organisation of Danish municipalities (Kommunernes landsforening, LGDK) 
who follow a national logic and – with an indisputable economic incentive4 – argue that residing at 
a shelter per se constitutes an unreasonable burden for the social system. The automatic rejection of 
EU nationals suggested here breaches with  the  Brey ruling and the discretion required in the Ministry 
guidelines as the potential burden on the social system is required to be assessed individually. Thus, 
even when made, municipal guidelines do not necessarily further the understanding of how to 
administer the new rules. The target group themselves are only poorly informed about  their expanded  
rights and expect to be denied access to public shelters (interviews 2015 PSMM3 and PSMM5). 
Municipalities and shelter managers are puzzled by the limited number of inquiries from EU nationals 
(interviews 2015 SLBM2-M3, SLBM5). ‘It is almost a non-existing phenomenon,’ a civil servant 
states (interview 2015 CSM1).  Meantime, inquiries at private shelters boom with around 250 per 
month (interviews 2015 PSMM3, PSMM5). The perception among EU nationals of continuously 
closed doors pushes the homeless from public shelters to private options. Private shelters provide 
basic help and shelter on a day-to-day basis, but no extensive socio-educational assistance or 
continuous guarantee of support. Instead, they are forced on a daily basis to refuse inquires because 
of lack of capacity (interviews 2015 PSMM3, PSMM5). 
In acknowledging the lack of more hands-on municipal guidelines, the Ministry has now planned to 
produce a new set of guidelines to the municipalities that could meet the demands of deﬁning central 
concepts and providing more speciﬁcations on when to allow or reject EU nationals (interview 2017 
CSMinistry). So far, however, continuous political salience of EU nationals’ access to Danish welfare 
discourages the Ministry from taking action (interview 2017 CSMinistry). Legal uncertainty is the 
preferred option when the rules are controversial. 
Inadequate vertical communication across the diﬀerent administrative  levels  results not only in 
fragmented dissemination of the guidelines but moreover in highly varied interpretations and 
compliance. Three of the ﬁve case municipalities (M1, M2 and M5) administer against the ministerial 
guidelines and deny access to EU nationals (interviews 2015 CSM1-M2, CSM5). Here, one 
municipality does not perceive the guidelines to lead     to legal change: ‘At ﬁrst, we thought that this 
would change our legal guidelines, but actually there was nothing new here. If an EU national knocks  
on  our  door  totally  shabby, of course he will be let in but only for a night or two’ (interview 2015, 
CSM1).     The level of protection provided here does not go beyond basic acute support. Another 
municipality (M2) oﬃcially welcomes the new guidelines but  has  refrained  from  changing practice. 
The civil servant disagrees with the European logic in the Ministry guide-  lines and refuses to expand 
the level of solidarity beyond own citizens (interview 2015 CSM2). 
Two municipalities on the other hand allow access to Union citizens. In stark contrast with the 
argumentation above, one perceives the guidelines not only as a simple orientation but as an actual 
legal change (interview 2015 CSM3). As a result, practices are changed both at municipal executive 
level and among shelter managers. The other municipality allowing access did so also before the 
Ministry guidelines supporting a European logic both before and after the change in ministerial 
guidelines (interviews 2015, CSM4, SLBM4). 
Interviews with shelter mangers reveal, however, that compliance with the municipal line on ground 
should not be taken for granted. Instead, shelter managers in the two denying municipalities (M1 and 
M5) dissent from the municipal line and allow access to EU nationals. ‘We, act on the basis of our 
charitable values and do not take residence permit or nationality into account’ (interview 2015 
SLBM1) resisting the national logic and clear managerial signalling from the executive level 
described beneath. Equally, the other shelter manager only requires lawful residence and refuses to 
assess potential unreasonable burden because helping people in need is their raison d’être irrespective 
of expenses. The behaviour of both shelter managers stresses the importance of the discretion made 
by street-level actors. Both make important and independent discretionary decisions even in one case 
despite strong managerial signalling. They also reﬂect, as Dörrenbächer has pointed out, that the 
individual attitude of the caseworker is likely to impact on his decisions (2017). 
In sum, practices are fragmented both across and within municipalities as summarised below (Figure 
1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 1 Practices and Compliance across Levels  
 New legal guidelines from the Ministry, intended to change practice into compliance with EU law, 
have been implemented in a highly fragmented manner. We conﬁrm our ﬁrst theoretical expectation 
and identify how dispositions of the street-level bureaucrats are informed by interaction and 
agreements between ministries, the executive levels at national and local levels. Beyond our 
theoretical expectation, we also identify that vertical, downward collaboration between the executive 
level and street-level bureau- crats inform their dispositions leaving them without suﬃcient 
knowledge of how to turn EU law into practice. 
  
Clarity of EU rules 
Clarity of EU rules has shown to condition the disposition of shelter managers in three diﬀerent ways. 
It is widely perceived that problems in practice primarily emerge because central but unclear legal 
concepts and conditions are left open for interpretation at the frontline (interviews 2015 SLBM1-
M5). ‘Lawful residence’, as an example, is a precondition for eligibility for shelters but relies upon 
complex legal assessment. Firstly, application of  social protection might for ﬁrst-time jobseekers 
conﬂict with the grounds on which residence permit was granted in the ﬁrst place; applying for shelter 
can, for example, disturb the impression of economic self-suﬃciency. Secondly, ﬁrst-time jobseekers 
have lawful residence for at least the ﬁrst six months’ residence but are not required to register upon 
arrival nor can they be imposed to document date of arrival. This creates      an obvious barrier for 
assessing the duration of residence. 
Moreover, ﬁrst-time job-seekers are not in Danish administration in general perceived eligible to 
social welfare (interviews 2015 CSDanish Immigration Service; 2015 and 2017 CSState 
Department). This practice reﬂects a national logic where status as worker is the typical precondition 
for social protection. The ministerial guidelines, however, express a European logic where Union 
citizens should be considered access and recourse to the social system should not automatically lead 
to an expulsion measure (Directive 2004/38, Art. 14 (3)). The risk of constituting an unreasonable 
burden, it is argued, should instead rely upon a ‘concrete assessment’ where duration of residence, 
‘personal circumstances’ and job search should be taken into account (cf, Brey, interview 2015  
CSState  Department). Without further guidance, this collision of arguments leaves shelter managers 
in the limbo between the European and national logic. 
The assessment becomes even more complex, when the EU applicant might have obtained worker 
status and is more ‘deserving’ according to a national logic. Here, the shelter manager is required to 
consider what qualiﬁes as actual employment, something the Court has struggled deﬁning throughout 
many decades. Furthermore, the shelter manager shall diﬀerentiate between EU migrants who have 
worked in Denmark for respectively less and more than 12 months (interview 2015 CSState 
Department, cf. Directive 2004/38 Article 7(3), cf. Alimanovic). Less than 12 months suggests a right 
to 6 months’ social welfare, whereas longer employments allow for social welfare as long as one 
looks for work in a genuine and eﬀective way (interviews 2015 CSState Department, CSDanish 
Immigration Service). 
The assessment of what constitutes an unreasonable burden is complicated further as the rules and 
Court cases are deﬁned upon receipt of social assistance, a beneﬁt-in-cash signiﬁcantly lower than 
the expenses associated with granting a beneﬁt- in-kind as a shelter spot.5 The shelter managers are 
not guided in whether or how to take actual expenses into account. Consequently, some ﬁnd it 
unreasonable to allow EU nationals access to shelters just for one night, whereas others treat them as 
Danes. In sum, the mere category of the Union citizen is deﬁning for the access to shelter but the 
various categories are not deﬁned in the Ministry guidelines. ‘I cannot,’ a shelter manger explains, 
‘ﬁnd my way around all the diﬀerent kinds of status that EU nationals can obtain’ (interview 2015 
SLBM2). ‘How do you,’ another shelter manager asks, ‘deﬁne a job-seeker? Do you require 
documentation that the person has been bicycling about to pizzerias with his CV?’ (interview 2015 
SLBM3). 
Our interviews revealed a second issue concerning the clarity of EU rules. The parallel application of 
1), EU law on free movement and 2), Danish national legislation on public shelters results, it is 
argued, in a Catch 22 situation. Applying one is perceived to exclude the other. Retaining worker 
status obliges the EU migrant to look for work in a genuine way (Directive 2004/38 Art. 7(1)b and 
14(4)). The guidelines require that EU nationals can provide documentation that they search for work 
and have ‘real chances for employ ment’. However, respondents argue that looking for work in a 
genuine way excludes the person from being categorised as a homeless and eligible to shelter 
according to Danish social legislation (interviews 2015 CSM1, SLBM2, SLBM5). Here, 
homelessness is deﬁned upon having social problems such as alcohol or drug addiction, psychiatric 
disorders or lack of social network either without a home or without ability to live in their home.6 ‘In 
order to be homeless within this deﬁnition,’ a municipality argues, ‘one cannot also look for work in 
a genuine way – and vice versa. The two situations are mutually exclusive’ (interview 2015 CSM1). 
The Catch 22 situation leaves it up to the shelter manager to manoeuver in this unclear discretionary 
space. 
A third issue concerning the clarity of EU rules emerges as, even when trying, shelter managers are 
often withheld from  further  guidance.  Insuﬃcient  knowledge  pushes  them into seeking legal 
advice at the municipal executive level.  Here  they,  however,  often express to be incapable of 
providing  clariﬁcation,  forcing  shelter  managers  to make the decision without the required 
knowledge. As a shelter manager describes; ‘but you are the one who is supposed to make the 
decision, he replies when I ask for advice’ (interview 2015 SLBM5). Civil servants refer to shelter 
managers, as  ‘they  know much more about the practices than we do’ (interview 2015 CSM4). The 
lack of suﬃcient guidance between administrative levels decentralises the interpretation  of  complex  
EU law and leaves the shelter managers with a large discretionary space. 
Several shelter managers disapprove of the degree of discretion that  they  are  supposed to manage 
and feel insuﬃciently informed to  master  the  rules  (interviews  2015 SLBM2-M3, SLBM4-M5). 
‘In this way, I get more power than I wish to have,’ (interview 2015SLBM4). As follows, discretion 
is tossed around the administrative system, unwanted by all levels but landing in the hands of street-
level  bureaucrats  who  are  forced to decide despite insuﬃcient qualiﬁcations. A legally binding  
administrative  principle ruling was ruled just a few weeks before the publication of the new Ministry 
guidelines and established that decisions made by  shelter  managers  cannot  be appealed.7 This 
requires to an even larger  degree  that  the  decision  is  correct  in  the  ﬁrst place. The shelter manager 
becomes sovereign  in his or her decisions – irrespective   of wishing it or not. 
Legal uncertainty confuses how EU law should be transformed into practice. We see here how central 
concepts are left open for interpretation by the Union legislators and remain undeﬁned by the 
competent Ministry. The implementation process thus carries ambiguities rooted in political conﬂicts 
at EU level down to shelter managers in the streets of Denmark. Not only horizontal but also 
inadequate vertical communication and collaboration inform the ability of the street-level bureaucrats 
to practice EU rules. Such decentralisation of discretion results in heterogeneous practices and uneven 
treatment   of Union citizens’ need for social protection across municipalities. 
  
Political and managerial signalling 
As a third parameter, also political and managerial signalling conditions the dispositions of street-
level bureaucrats. When studying de facto implementation all the way to the ground, it becomes 
evident that EU legislation and the CJEU case law constitute distant opaque reference points whereas 
national legislation has clearer and more directly applicable eﬀect. When practitioners are asked to 
handle both European law and national legislation, the choice falls upon the national legislation being 
the nearest and most clearly deﬁned option. ‘When I assess a citizen’s rights,’ a civil servant explains, 
‘I know in the background somewhere is EU law, but to be honest, I ﬁnd it irrelevant. I am not 
competent to assess EU law and I do not expect that I am required to have knowledge about EU law 
in any way. I only consider what is incorporated into Danish legislation’ (interview 2015 CSM2). 
European law recedes into the background with no prevalence other than if directly incorporated into 
Danish legislation. The mere act of circulating the new guidelines over email alone and not 
incorporating them as published legal guidelines in this way functions as managerial signalling in 
itself. The process reﬂects lack of ownership and the new guidelines are not, it signals, of high 
importance. The Ministry is perceived unwilling to provide concrete useful answers on the 
interpretation of the rules. ‘Their answers are too vague and useless’ (interview 2015 CSM2). The 
civil servant suggests that their vagueness is rooted in an attempt to evade a clear stance on a 
politically sensitive topic. The lack of communication also becomes managerial signalling in itself 
suggesting to ignore potential politically sensitive cases. As a result, the safe choice becomes to reject 
Union citizens. 
Several shelter managers outlined the resistance towards the new guidelines by the association of 
Danish municipalities (LGDK) during our interviews. When asked whether to follow the EU and 
Ministry line or their interest organisation perspective, a shelter manager responded that the LGDK 
is ‘in a way our overall employer. They are the ones    we listen to’ (interview 2015 SLBM3). Several 
others express similar national legal logic and articulate sympathy with the interest organisation’s 
interpretation of the law. ‘I am after all hired to serve my own municipal citizens – not Poles who just 
arrived’ (interview 2015 CSM2). The shelter manager subsequently follows these instructions and 
rejects Union citizens because of the clear managerial signalling (interview 2015 SLBM2). 
In contrast to the clear standpoint reﬂected in the former Ministry guidelines, the political signalling 
of the new instructions is close to non-existing. The only  clear  example of political signalling agitates 
against allowing Union citizens access and is expressed by the highest political leader in one of the 
biggest municipalities. ‘We, in Denmark,’ he states on the municipality website in direct  
confrontation  with  the  Ministry, ‘should be extremely aware that we do not take on all Europe’s 
social  and poverty issues in our eagerness to demonstrate our pan-European sentiment.’ ‘A spot at    
a shelter costs 1000 to 2400 DKR [133 to 320 Euro ed.] per day and it would be an unreasonable 
burden for the social system in Denmark if  a  person  merely  on  the  grounds of being a job-seeking 
EU national should have access to the shelters’.8 The political signalling is unmistakably clear here, 
reﬂecting a national  logic  where  own citizens should be prioritised over other Europeans. The strong 
political signalling has gained ground and is followed in the frontline of this municipality  where  
similar  arguments are expressed. 
The only political signalling from the Ministry comes in a form of indirect threat against making a 
faulty decision. Just prior to circulating the new guidelines, the Minister made it clear to the Danish 
Parliament that taking in unregistered Union citizens at shelters comes with the risk up to 2 years 
imprisonment, a rather unusual working condition for a street-level bureaucrat.9 This was again 
repeated at the orientation meeting in December 2014 (interviews 2015 SLBM3, CSDanish 
Immigration Service). A ripple of reactions apparently ran through the administrative system and left 
no doubt among shelter managers about the risks of taking in Union citizens. 
Shelter managers are informed by weak managerial signalling combined with strong political 
signalling agitating respectively against the new guidelines or against making faulty decisions. 
Without a notion of ownership through guidance on central concepts, national law remains primacy 
over EU law. As a consequence, EU law is perceived opaque, irrelevant and distant from the everyday 
at the frontline. 
Conclusion  
The CJEU is argued to play a tremendous role for the expansion  and  subsequent  restriction of social 
rights for Europeans who exercise their right to free movement in the Union. This paper argues that 
no matter the trends in the Court’s rulings, EU compliance literature has overlooked the crucial role 
of street-level bureaucrats in turning EU law into actual material rights for Europeans on the move. 
This paper shows that the EU regulation in this ﬁeld forms two separate and contradictory, yet 
coexisting, legal logics, respectively a European and a national logic. The ﬁrst expresses cross-border 
solidarity based upon Union Citizenship, reﬂected in expansive rulings such as Sala and Brey. The 
second, contrarily, expresses protection of national welfare based upon principles of earning access 
to national welfare through obtaining status as a worker. This logic is reﬂected in restrictive rulings 
such as Förster, Vatsouras, Dano and Alimanovic. Our paper ﬁnds that when such a complex set of 
rules is implemented on the ground, street-level bureaucrats administer in the limbo between the two 
logics without suﬃcient guidance from higher national administrative levels. Core legal concepts 
such as ‘unreasonable burden’, ‘jobseeker’ and ‘worker’ left undeﬁned by the Union legislators and 
continuously unclear due to changing trends in the Court’s jurisprudence remain undeﬁned by 
national administration. In this way, implementation carries the ambiguities left behind by legislators, 
and discretion is decentralised with the result of a fragmented implementation on the ground. Street-
level bureaucrats, we show, play a crucial yet so far understudied role in turning EU law   into action. 
Compliance across levels shows to be a faraway idealistic ambition and a Europe in numerous 
administrative levels appears to come with correspondingly various practices. 
New ministerial guidelines were supposed to widen Union solidarity and expand the social rights for 
homeless Union citizens in Denmark. We show that this attempt to change practice from resting upon 
a national to a European logic has only had limited eﬀect. On these grounds, we conclude that street-
level  bureaucrats play a  remarkable  role for the actual outcome of Europeanisation. Given their 
understudied yet crucial role    in implementing EU law, we have examined three theoretical 
expectations on what inﬂuences their dispositions when carrying out these rules. Interaction between 
executive levels, especially inadequate inter-ministerial coordination has made the Ministry 
guidelines ambiguous and diﬃcult to translate into a homogenous practice. Sparse horizontal 
coordination hampers both the interpretation and dissemination of the new guidelines. We also found 
that clarity of EU rules plays a remarkable role in the transformation of EU law in action. Street-level 
bureaucrats ﬁnd themselves left with more discretion than they can manage and are forced to make 
decisions  without  further guidance  on undeﬁned key concepts, such as ‘unreasonable burden’ and 
‘jobseeker’ and ‘worker’. Uncertainty of and contestation concerning the interpretation have  made 
the Ministry and municipal executive levels leave them undeﬁned  and  push  the  discretion down in 
the hands of shelter managers. Ambiguity travels with the implementation process, we conclude. 
Thirdly, vague managerial signalling hampers ownership and prioritisation of the new ministerial 
guidelines. Strong political signalling on the other hand agitates for non- compliance. Overall, this 
case conﬁrms our expectations that the dispositions of street- level bureaucrats play a crucial, yet 
overlooked, role in the practical implementation of      EU law. 
The concurrent existence of the two diﬀerent logics have in conclusion made inter- action more 
diﬃcult, EU rules appear more unclear and made street-level bureaucrats  more vulnerable to political 
signalling.  This has altogether weakened their dispositions to administer European free movement. 
Besides the theoretical expectations, we further- more discovered that primacy of national law and 
local preferences over EU law forms a central implementation barrier. EU law has direct eﬀect and 
supremacy, as established with respectively Van Gend (C-26–62) and Costa vs Enel (C-6–64), but 
we identify another reality on the ground. Without clear EU rules or national guidelines, the 
implementation behaviour of street-level bureaucrats ultimately deﬁnes the outcomes of EU law. EU 
law recedes into the background while national and local interpretations and agendas rule       in 
practice. This may be less of a problem when EU rules derive from Directives that will be transposed 
into national law. This did not, however, protect homeless Union citizens    as their derived access to 
public shelters was left uncommented during the transposition phase (cf. ‘EU-
Opholdsbekendtgørelsen’). This group remains on  the margins of society  and somewhat left between 
borders. A so far understudied and  wider  problem,  how- ever, may arise from this when the EU 
rules are based on the Treaty, Court-driven or ensured by Regulations, as such legal structures depend 
crucially on the dispositions of  local implementers in administrating in accordance with EU  law.  
Especially  here,  their role becomes crucial for the protection of the law and mobile Europeans’ legal 
rights. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the national logic is primarily founded in secondary legislation 
and thus more easily overcomes this problem whereas the European logic predominantly is pushed 
forward by Treaty provisions and the Court rulings, which presumably come with a higher risk of 
being compromised in the practical implementation. 
Secondly, we show that not only horizontal but also insuﬃcient vertical interaction across all 
administrative levels plays a remarkable role for the ﬁnal outcome. Not only inter-organizational 
conditions should be taken into account when considering EU implementation, but also 
communication and cooperation across administrative levels. This might especially count for 
governance in a highly multilevel setting like this where complex EU rules deﬁned in Brussels and 
Luxembourg are transformed  into  material  social rights in the streets of Member States. 
Without improved cooperation across administrative levels, comprehensible interpretation of legal 
concepts as well as clear political and managerial signalling, discretion is pushed downward and 
decentralised to street-level bureaucrats in the frontlines who are left without suﬃcient knowledge or 
guidance. Here, the speciﬁc scope of Union solidarity is instead informed by local agendas and street-
level agency. New EU decision- making or jurisprudence may come to further clarify the scope of 
Union solidarity and how to manoeuver between the European and national logic but will be 
redundant without further Europeanisation of the local administration and street-level bureaucrats. 
Without Europeanisation of the local and frontline levels, Union solidarity gets lost in translation. 
 
Notes 
1. LBK nr 1117 af 02/10/2017. 
2. BEK nr 474 af 12/05/2011. 
3. LBK nr 988 af 17/08/2017 art. 110. 
4. The municipalities bear half of the expenses (LBK nr 102 af 29/01/2018 art. 177 (1) number 5). 
5. Social assistance: 930–1450 euro per month. Residence at a homeless shelter: 6000–12,800 euro 
per month. 
6. VEJ nr 14 af 15/02/2011 art. 171. 
7. Principle ruling 60–14 KEN nr 9900 af 14/11/2014. 
8. Municipality of Aarhus, 12 May 2014, ’Socialrådmand: Danske forsorgshjem er ikke for 
arbejdsløse EU-borgere’ https://www.aarhus.dk/da/omkommunen/nyheder/2014/Maj/ Danske-
forsorgshjem.aspx, our italics. 
9. SOU Alm.del endeligt svar på spørgsmål 23, sagsnr. 2014–10,095. 
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